

PPEI4000
Semester one, 2019

Evidence and Argument in Moral and Political Philosophy

Conveners

Keith Dowding keith.dowding@anu.edu.au

Lars Moen lars.moen@anu.edu.au

Analytic moral and political philosophy proceeds largely through a substantive argument considering the coherence and consistency of moral theories. Moral and political theories are held up to the standards of reason to examine consistency and values to see whether they conform to what reasonable people think should happen. This course is designed to challenge the methods of moral and political theory. How rational is conceptual analysis and how should we go about it? Are moral and political concepts too complex and disputed to be conceptually coherent? Do our interests and ideology shape our conceptual framework? What is the nature of human intuitions? What is the role of thought experiments and intuition pumps, and the nature of reflective equilibrium? What is the nature of a reason and what is its relationship to values, beliefs and wants? Finally we think about how these topics impact on the debate between ideal and non-ideal theory, feasibility and the growing interest in realist political philosophy.

Assessment

10%	Class participation
30%	Continual Assessment by short answers to a weekly question
20%	Structure and Plan of the Essay (due in week 8)
40%	3000 Word Essay (due in week 12)

Programme

Dowding will teach in Hayden Allen Building Room 1223

Moen will teach in the John Warhurst Room

Teacher	Keith Dowding	Lars Moen
Week 1	Introduction: Moral and Political Philosophy	
Week 2	Conceptual Analysis: Essential Contestability	Conceptual Analysis: Value Freeness
Week 3	Thought Experiments and Reflective Equilibrium	What are Intuitions and Experimental Philosophy
Week 4	The Method of Elimination	Constructivism

Week 5	Interpreting Texts	Facts and Principles
Week 6	Realism in Political Philosophy	Ideal and Non-Ideal Theory and Feasibility
Week 7		Public Reason and Congruence

Readings and Questions

Topic 1: Introduction: Moral and Political Philosophy; Theory and Evidence

Questions

- What is the difference between moral and political philosophy?
- Do we need to understand anything about political science to do political philosophy?

Required reading

Waldron, Jeremy (2013), 'Political Political Theory: An Inaugural Lecture', *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 21 (1), 1-23.

Recommended reading

Andrea Sangiovanni, 'Justice and the Priority of Politics to Morality', *Journal of Political Philosophy* 16 (2008): 137-164.

Aaron James, 'Constructing Justice for Existing Practice: Rawls and the Status Quo', *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 33 (2005): 281-316.

Miriam Ronzoni, 'The Global Order: A Case of Background Injustice? A Practice-Dependent Account', *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 37 (2009): 229-256.

Laura Valentini, 'Global Justice and Practice-Dependence: Conventionalism, Institutionalism, Functionalism', *Journal of Political Philosophy* 19 (2011): 399-418.

Dowding, Keith (2016), *The Philosophy and Methods of Political Science* (London: Palgrave), ch. 9, pp. 213-215

Topic 2: Conceptual Analysis: Essential Contestability

Questions

- What is essential contestability?
- Does Wittgenstein's idea of family resemblance help us to overcome problems in giving necessary and sufficient conditions for concepts
- What is the relationship, if any, between concepts having family resemblance and Gallie's idea of essential contestability
- Are some political concepts essentially vague?

Required reading

Gallie, W. B. (1956), 'Essentially Contested Concepts', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 56 (2), 167-98.

Recommended reading

Biletzk, Anat (2014), 'Ludwig Wittgenstein', *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wittgenstein/>), section 3.4

- Collier, David and Mahon, James (1993), "Conceptual Stretching" Revisited: Adapting Categories in Comparative Analysis', *American Political Science Review*, 87, 845-55.
- Connolly, William E. (1983), *The Terms of Political Discourse Second Edition* (Oxford: Martin Robertson), chs. 1, 3 and 6
- Dowding, Keith 'Rigid Designation and Essential Contestability' MS
- Keith Dowding and William Bosworth (2018) 'Ambiguity and Vagueness in Political Terminology: On Coding and Referential Imprecision' *European Journal of Political Theory* online first
- Forster, Michael (2010), 'Wittgenstein on family resemblance concepts', in Arif Ahmed (ed.), *Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations: A Critical Guide* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Haugaard, Mark (2010), 'Power: A "Family Resemblance" Concept', *European Journal of Cultural Studies*, 13 (4), 419-38.
- Tversky, Amos (1977), 'Features of Similarity', *Psychological Review*, 84, 327-52.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1953), *Philosophical Investigations* (Oxford: Blackwell), paragraphs 65-69, pp. 31-3

Topic 3: Conceptual Analysis: Value Freeness

Questions

- Is giving necessary and sufficient conditions the correct way to define a concept?
- Can concepts be value free in political philosophy?

Required reading

Carter, Ian (2015), 'Value-freeness and Value-neutrality in the Analysis of Political Concepts', in *Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy*, vol. 1, ed. D. Sobel, P. Vallentyne and S. Wall, pp. 279-306.

Recommended reading

- Kramer, Matthew (2018), 'Conceptual Analysis and Distributive Justice', in *The Oxford Handbook of Distributive Justice*, ed. Serena Olsaretti, 367-86.
- Collier, David and Levitsky, Steven (1997), 'Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research', *World Politics*, 49, 430-51.
- DePaul, Michael R. and Ramsay, Alan (eds.) (1998), *Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry* (London: Rowman & Littlefield), esp ch. 5, 10
- Dowding, Keith (2016), *The Philosophy and Methods of Political Science* (London: Palgrave), ch. 8
- Dworkin, Ronald (2004), 'Hart's Postscript and the Character of Political Philosophy'. *Oxford Journal of Legal Studies* 24(1): sections 1 and 2.
- Goertz, Gary (2006), *Social Science Concepts: A User's Guide* (Princeton: Princeton University Press) ch. 1-3.
- Oppenheim, Felix (1981), *Political Concepts: A Reconstruction* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell), ch. 1 and 9.

Topic 4: Thought Experiments and Reflective Equilibrium

Questions

- What are thought experiments?
- What do they really teach us and how should they be used
- What is wide reflective equilibrium?
- What are intuitions in Rawls account of reflective equilibrium?
- Is reflective equilibrium as conservative as Peter Singer suggests?
- There might be multiple equilibriums. How might we choose between them?

Thought experiments required reading

Brownlee, Kimberley and Zofia Stemplowska (2017), 'Thought Experiments', in *Methods in Analytical Political Theory*, ed. Adrian Blau, 21-45.

Recommended reading

Dowding, Keith (2016), *The Philosophy and Methods of Political Science* (London: Palgrave), ch. 9, pp. 228-40

Brendel, Elke (2004), 'Intuition Pumps and the Proper Use of Thought Experiments', *Dialectica*, 58 (1), 88-108.

Bunzl, Martin (1996), 'The Logic of Thought Experiments', *Synthese*, 106 (2), 227-40.

Cole, D. (1984), 'Thought and Thought Experiments', *Philosophical Studies*, 45 (4), 431-44.

Cooper, Rachel (2005), 'Thought Experiments', *Metaphilosophy*, 36 (3), 328-47

Danley, John R. (1985), 'An Examination of the Fundamental Assumption of Hypothetical Process Arguments', *Philosophical Studies*, 48 (1), 83-89.

Jackson, Michael W. (1992), 'The 'Gedankenexperiment' Method of Ethics', *Journal of Value Inquiry*, 26 (4), 525-35.

Morris, Peter (2008) 'Causistry and Chess: Some Methodological Lessons for Ethics' in Benjamin Hale (ed) *Philosophy Looks at Chess* Chicago, Open Court

Norton, John D. (1996), 'Are Thought Experiments Just What You Thought?', *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, 26 (3), 333-36.

Otuska, Michael (2008) 'Double Effect, Triple Effect and the Trolley Problem: Squaring the Circle in Looping Cases' *Utilitas* 20 (1): 92-110

Ward, D (1995), 'Imaginary Scenarios, Black Boxes and Philosophical Method', *Erkenntnis*, 43 (1), 181-98.

Wilkes, Kathleen V. (1988), *Real People: Personal Identity without Thought Experiments* (Oxford: Clarendon Press), ch 1

Reflective equilibrium required reading

Daniels, Norman (2013), 'Reflective Equilibrium', in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*

(<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/reflective-equilibrium/>).

Recommended reading

Cummins, Robert (1998), 'Reflection on Relective Equilibrium', in Michael R. DePaul and Alan Ramsay (eds.), *Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry* (London: Rowman & Littlefield).

- Daniels, Norman (1979), 'Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics', *Journal of Philosophy*, 76 (5), 256-82.
- Daniels, Norman (1996), *Justice and Justification: Reflective Equilibrium Theory in Practice* (New York: Cambridge University Press).
- DePaul, Michael R. and Ramsay, Alan (eds.) (1998), *Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry* (London: Rowman & Littlefield), esp chs. 6, 7, 16
- Rawls, John (1951), 'Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics', *Philosophical Review*, 60 (2), 177-97 reprinted in his *Collected Papers* (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press), 1-19.
- Rawls, John (1971), *A Theory of Justice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 48-51
- Singer, Peter (1974), 'Sidgwick and Reflective Equilibrium', *Monist*, 58 (4), 490-517.
- Singer, Peter (2005), 'Ethics and Intuitions', *Journal of Ethics*, 9 (4), 331-52.

Topic 5: What are Intuitions and Experimental Philosophy

Questions

- What is the role of dual process thinking according to psychologists
- What are intuitions, according to psychologists? (Do they all think of the same way?)
- When is intuitive thinking advantageous according to psychologists
- Compare and contrast the intuitive thinking of fireman (according to Klein) and that of chess grandmasters (see Gobet and Simon)
- What are 'rational intuitions'?
- What are 'empirical intuitions'?
- Is the distinction useful and defensible?
- Can we consider intuitions (in any sense of the term) as evidence? In what sense are the best seen as evidence? When, if ever, should we discount intuitions as evidential?
- How do the experimental philosophers treat intuitions?
- What do we learn about what philosophers claim that Trolley teaches us from the experiments of Haidt, Greene and others?
- Can such psychology destroy moral philosophy as it has been practised? What could be salvaged? Or is experimental philosophy largely irrelevant?

Required Reading

- Haidt, Jonathan (2001), 'The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgement', *Psychological Review*, 108 (4), 814-34.
- Alfano, Mark and Alexandra Plakias, 'Experimental Moral Philosophy', *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/experimental-moral/>.

Recommended readings psychology

- DePaul, Michael R. and Ramsay, Alan (eds.) (1998), *Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry* (London: Rowman & Littlefield), esp chs. 3-5, 9
- Evans, Jonathan St. B. T. (2008), 'Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning and Judgement, and Social Cognition', *Annual Review of Sociology*, 59, 255-78.
- Evans, Jonathan St. B. T. and Frankish, Keith (eds.) (2009), *In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

- Gobet, Fernand and Simon, Herbert A. (1996), 'Recall of Rapidly Presented Random Chess Positions is a Function of Skill', *Psychonomic Bulletin & Review*, 3 (2), 159-63.
- Kahneman, Daniel (2011), *Thinking Fast and Slow* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux) ch. 22
- Klein, Gary (1999), *Sources of Power* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
- Viljenquist, K., Zhong, C. B, and Galinsky, A. D. (2010), 'The Smell of Virtue: Clean Scents Promote Reciprocity and Charity', *Psychological Science*, 21 (3), 381-83.

EITHER

- Greene, Joshua D. (2013), *Moral Tribes: Emotion, Reason, and the Gap between Us and Them* (New York: Penguin).
- Haidt, Jonathan (2012), *The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion* (Harmondsworth: Penguin).

OR

- Greene, Joshua D. and Haidt, Jonathan (2002), 'How (and Where) Does Moral Judgement Work?', *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*, 6 (12), 517-23.
- Greene, Joshua D., et al. (2001), 'An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgement', *Science*, 293 (5537), 2105-08.
- Greene, Joshua D., et al. (2004), 'The Neural Bases of Cognitive Conflict and Control in Moral Judgement', *Neuron*, 44 (2), 389.
- Haidt, Jonathan (2003), 'The Moral Emotions', in R. J. Davidson, K. R. Scherer, and H. H. Goldsmith (eds.), *Handbook of Affective Sciences* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 852-70.

Recommended readings philosophy

- Audi, Robert (2008), 'Intuition, Inference, and Rational Disagreement in Ethics', *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice*, 11 (3), 475-92.
- Bedke, M. S. (2008), 'Ethical Intuitions: What They are, What They are Not and How They Justify', *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 45, 253-69.
- Chudnoff, Elijah (2011a), 'The Nature of Intuitive Justification', *Philosophical Studies*, 153 (3), 313-33.
- Chudnoff, Elijah (2011b), 'What Intuitions Are Like', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 82 (4), 625-54
- DePaul, Michael R. and Ramsay, Alan (eds.) (1998), *Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry* (London: Rowman & Littlefield), esp chs. 8, 12, 13
- Liao, Matthew (2008), 'A Defence of Intuitions', *Philosophical Studies*, 140 (1), 247-62.
- Tolhurst, William (1998), 'Seemings', *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 35 (2), 293-302.
- Williamson, Timothy (2004), 'Philosophical "Intuitions" and Scepticism about Judgement', *Dialectica*, 58 (1), 109-53.
- Wykstra, Stephanie, 'Out of the Armchair', *Aeon*, <https://aeon.co/essays/beyond-the-armchair-must-philosophy-become-experimental>.

Topic 6: The Method of Elimination

Questions

- What distinguishes real conceptual disputes from verbal disputes?

- How useful is the subscript strategy in dealing with conceptual dispute?
- Can the subscript strategy really overcome essential contestability?
- Is elimination the simple solution to ideology in political argument?

Required reading

Bosworth, William (2016) 'An Interpretation of Political Argument', *European Journal of Political Theory*, online first.

Recommended reading

Berlin, Isaiah (1969) 'Two Concepts of Liberty' in his *Four Essays on Liberty* (Oxford: Clarendon).

Chalmers, David J. (2011), 'Verbal Disputes', *Philosophical Review*, 120 (4), 515-66.

Dowding, Keith (1991), *Rational Choice and Political Power* (Aldershot: Edward Elgar), ch. 8, esp. pp. 167-173

Hirsch, Eli (2005) 'Physical-Object Ontology, Verbal Disputes, and Common Sense', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 70 (1), 67-97.

Waldron, Jeremy (2007) 'Pettit's Molecule' in Brennan, Goodin, Jackson and Smith (eds.) *Common Minds: Themes from the Philosophy of Philip Pettit*, pp. 143-60.

Topic 7: Constructivism

Questions

- What is a constructivist procedure, and what is its output?
- What are the characteristics of the 'reasonable person', and what is her or his significance in constructivism?
- How does constructivism differ from 'rational intuitionism'?
- What is distinct about *political* constructivism?

Required reading

James, Aaron (2014), 'Political Constructivism', in *A Companion to Rawls*, ed. Jon Mandle and David A. Reidy (Oxford: Blackwell), 251-264.

Rawls, John, (2005), *Political Liberalism*, revised edition (New York, NY: Columbia University Press), 89-129.

Recommended reading

Bagnoli, Carla (2017), 'Constructivism in Metaethics'. *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

Darwall, Stephen, Allan Gibbard, and Peter Railton (1992), 'Toward *Fin de siècle* Ethics: Some Trends', *The Philosophical Review* 101 (1), esp. 137-144.

James, Aaron (2018), 'Constructivism, Intuitionism, and Ecumenism', in *The Oxford Handbook of Distributive Justice*, ed. Serena Olsaretti (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 346-366.

Krasnoff, Larry (2015), 'Constructivism: Kantian/Political', in *The Cambridge Rawls Lexicon*, ed. Jon Mandle and David A. Reidy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 149-156.

O'Neill, Onora (2003), 'Constructivism in Rawls and Kant', *The Cambridge Companion to Rawls*, ed. Samuel Freeman (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press), 347-367.

Scanlon, T. M. (1982), 'Contractualism and Utilitarianism', in *Utilitarianism and beyond*, ed. Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 103-128.

Topic 8: Interpreting Texts

Questions

- Do we have to understand the history of a concept to understand how we use it today?
- Do we have to know the intentions of an author when interpreting their use of concepts?

Required Reading

Blau, Adrian (2017) 'Interpreting Texts' in Blau (ed) *Analytical Political Theory* ch. 12

Recommended reading

Dowding, Keith (2016), *The Philosophy and Methods of Political Science* (London: Palgrave), ch. 9, pp. 216-223

Barry, Brian (1965) *Political Argument* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul)

Skinner, Quentin (2002), *Visions of Politics, Volume 1: Regarding Method* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), esp. ch 1, 4, 5 and 10.

Skinner, Quentin (1989) 'The State' in Ball, Farr, and Hanson (eds.) *Political Innovation and Conceptual Change*.

Pocock, J. G. A (1972), *Politics, Language and Time: Essays on Political Thought and History* (Chicago: Chicago University Press).

Pocock, J. G. A (2009), *Political Thought and History: Essays on Theory and Method* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Tully, James (ed.), (1988), *Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and His Critics* (Oxford: Polity), ch. 1, 14

Topic 9: Facts and Principles

Questions

- What is the relationship between facts and principles
- Are there fact-insensitive principles

Required reading

G. A. Cohen, *Rescuing Justice and Equality* (Harvard University Press, 2008), part II. [Or his 'Facts and Principles', *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 31 (2003): 211–245.]

Recommended reading

David Miller, 'Political Philosophy for Earthlings' in David Leopold and Marc Stears (eds.), *Political Theory: Methods and Approaches* (Oxford University Press, 2008): 29-48.

Samuel Freeman, 'Constructivism, Facts, and Moral Justification' in Thomas Christiano and John Christman (eds.), *Contemporary Debates in Political Philosophy* (Wiley-Blackwell, 2009): 41-60.

Ahmet Faik Kurtulmus, 'Rawls and Cohen on Facts and Principles', *Utilitas* 21 (2009):

489-505.

Andrew Mason, 'What Is the Point of Justice?', *Utilitas* 24 (2012): 525-547.

Andrew Mason, 'Just Constraints', *British Journal of Political Science* 34 (2004): 251-268.

Thomas Pogge, 'Cohen to the Rescue!', *Ratio* 21 (2008): 454-475.

Miriam Ronzoni and Laura Valentini, 'On the Meta-ethical Status of Constructivism: Reflections on G.A. Cohen's "Facts and Principles"', *Politics, Philosophy and Economics* 7 (2008): 403-22.

Andrew Williams, 'Justice, Incentives and Constructivism', *Ratio* 21 (2008): 476-493.

Topic 10: Realism in Political Philosophy

- What is political realism? How would we do political philosophy differently?
- What
- Do we need to understand our current institutions to design new ones?
- If a well-ordered society is utopian, what sort of order do we design for?

Required reading

Williams, Bernard (2005), *In the Beginning was the Deed: Realism and Moralism in Political Argument* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press), ch. 1.

Recommended reading

Jubb, Robert (2017) 'Realism' in Adria Blau *Analytical Political Theory* ch 7

Galston, William A (2010), 'Realism in Political Theory', *European Journal of Political Theory*, 9 (4), 385-411.

Philp, Mark (2010), 'What is to be done? Political theory and political realism', *European Journal of Political Theory*, 9 (4), 466-84.

Sleat, Matt(2015), 'Realism, Liberalism and Non-Ideal Theory or, are There Two Ways to Do Realistic Political Theory?', *Political Studies*. Published online first 2014

Topic 11: Ideal and Non-Ideal Theory and Feasibility

Questions

- What do you think are the main differences between ideal and non-ideal theory
- Can there be a role for intuitions in ideal theory? If so, in what sense?
- Can we use our moral intuitions to critique ideal theory?
- Is ideal theory essentially a political or essentially a moral theory?

Required reading

Zofia Stemplowska and Adam Swift, 'Ideal and Nonideal Theory', in D. Estlund (ed.) *Oxford Handbook of Political Philosophy* (Oxford University Press, 2012): 373-89.

Pablo Gilabert and Holly Lawford-Smith, 'Political Feasibility: A Conceptual Exploration', *Political Studies* 60 (2012): 809-825.

Recommended reading ideal theory

A. John Simmons (2010), 'Ideal and Nonideal Theory', *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 38 (1), 5-36.

Amartya Sen (2006) 'What do we Want from a Theory of Justice?', *Journal of*

- Philosophy* 103 (2006): 215-238 or his *The Idea of Justice* (Harvard University Press, 2009), esp the Introduction.
- Cohen, G. A. (2008) *Rescuing Justice and Equality* Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, ch 6
- Farrelly, Colin (2007), 'Justice in Ideal Theory: A Refutation', *Political Studies*, 55 (4), 844-64.
- Hamlin, Alan and Stemplowska, Zofia (2012), 'Theory, Ideal Theory and the Theory of Ideals', *Political Studies Review*, 10 (1), 48-62.
- Schmidtz, David (2011), 'Nonideal Theory: What It Is and What It Needs to Be', *Ethics*, 121 (4), 772-96.
- Stemplowska, Zofia (2008), 'What Is Ideal about Ideal Theory?', *Social Theory and Practice*, 34 (3), 319-40.
- Swift, Adam (2008), 'The Value of Philosophy in Nonideal Circumstances', *Social Philosophy and Practice*, 34 (3).
- Valentini, Laura (2009), 'On the Apparent Paradox of Ideal Theory', *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 17 (3), 332-55.
- Wiens, David (2012), 'Prescribing Institutions Without Ideal Theory', *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 20 (45-70).
- Wiens, David (2015) 'Political Ideals and the Feasibility Frontier' *Economics and Philosophy* 31(3), pp. 447-477

Recommended reading feasibility

- Brennan, Geoffrey and Philip Pettit (2007), 'The Feasibility Issue', in *The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy*, ed. Frank Jackson and Michael Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 258-79.
- Anca Gheaus, 'The Feasibility Constraint on The Concept of Justice', *The Philosophical Quarterly* 63 (2013): 445-464.
- Nicholas Southwood (2016), 'Does "Ought" Imply "Feasible"?'', *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 44: 7-45.
- Holly Lawford-Smith (2013), 'Understanding Political Feasibility', *Journal of Political Philosophy* 21: 243-259.
- Zofia Stemplowska (2016), 'Feasibility: Individual and Collective', *Social Philosophy and Policy* 33(1-2): 273-91.
- Geoffrey Brennan and Nicholas Southwood, 'Feasibility in Action and Attitude' in Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, Björn Petersson, Jonas Josefsson, and Dan Egonsson (eds.), *Hommage a Wlodek: Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz*.
<http://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/Brennan&Southwood.p>
- Pablo Gilabert (2012), 'Comparative Assessments of Justice, Political Feasibility, and Ideal Theory', *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 15: 39-56.
- Robert Jubb and Ahmet Faik Kurtulmus (2012), 'No Country for Honest Men: Political Philosophers and Real Politics', *Political Studies* 60: 539-556.

Topic 12: Public Justification

Questions

- What distinguishes the consensus and convergence models of public justification?
- What are some strengths and weaknesses with these two models?

- What is 'public reason'?
- Should fundamental political principles be based strictly on public reason?
- Should we accept religious convictions as basis for arguments in public deliberation? Why or why not?

Required reading

Rawls, John (1997), 'The Idea of Public Reason Revisited', *University of Chicago Law Review*, 64 (3), 765-807.

Gaus, Gerald. F. and Kevin Vallier (2009), 'The Roles of Religious Conviction in a Publicly Justified Polity', *Philosophy & Social Criticism* 35, no. 1-2, 51-76.

Recommended reading

Billingham, Paul (2015), 'Convergence Justifications Within Political Liberalism: A Defence', *Res Publica* 22 (2), 135-153.

Gaus, Gerald F. (1997) 'Reason, Justification, and Consensus: Why Democracy Can't Have It All', in *Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics*, ed. James Bohman and William Rehg, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), 205-42.

Larmore, C. (2003). 'Public Reason', *Cambridge Companion to Rawls*, Samuel Freeman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 368-393.

Quong, Jonathan (2014), 'What Is the Point of Public Reason?', *Philosophical Studies* 170: 545-553.

Scanlon, T. M. (2003), 'Rawls on Justification', in *A Cambridge Companion to Rawls*, ed. Samuel Freeman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 139-167.